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AN ESSAY ON HORSELESS CARRIAGES
AND PAPERLESS NEGOTIABLE
INSTRUMENTS: SOME LESSONS FROM
THE ARTICLE 8 REVISION
JAMES S. ROGERS'
When locomotives were developed in the early part of the nine-
teenth century, they were called "iron horses." When automobiles
were developed at the end of the nineteenth century, they were called
"horseless carriages." Today, those metaphors sound quaint. It is
amusing that the people of the nineteenth century could not think of
these marvelous new devices in any way other than by commenting
on their "horseness" or lack thereof. But were the terms really all
that odd? At the time, horseness was not an incidental characteristic
of modes of land transportation. From the dawn of civilization, the
legs of animals-whether human or non-human-provided the only
means of land transportation, and for many any centuries the horse
had been the animal of choice. In a very real sense, horseness was a
key concept in land transport, so any new means of land transport
could quite sensibly be regarded as some variant on the horse. If the
automobile had remained a plaything for the rich and our air re-
mained pungent with the odor of manure rather than petroleum
fumes, no adjective would need be added to the word "carriage" to
express the assumed "horse drawn"; and an automobile still would
be, in a sense more literal than metaphoric, a horseless carriage. But
that's not what happened. Horses and carriages are now the curiosi-
ties; cars and trucks are the ordinary modes of land transport. Not
surprisingly, then, the "horseless carriage" metaphor has become ar-
chaic. As practices change, so too must language and concepts. That,
in a nutshell, is the lesson to be drawn from the past few decades'
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work on the commercial law of investment securities.
Article 8 has the distinction of being the first article of the Uni-
fonn Commercial Code· to reach the third generation. We have the
original version,l the 1978 version,2 and now the 1994 version.3 The
original version of Article 8 was based on the traditional system in
which transfer of securities was effected by physical delivery of certif-
icates from seller to buyer. The 1978 version added new provisions
dealing with "uncertificated securities." The most recent revision
effort recast the law to deal more adequately with the system of secu-
rities holding through intennediarles.
For those interested in the study of the process of legal response
to technological change, the somewhat checkered career of the 1978
revision of Article 8 is an extremely instructive episode. What was
done in that revision project was so obviously sensible that it is hard
to imagine how one could have done anything else. Indeed, there are
probably many projects exactly like the 1978 revision that are cur-
rently either being considered or undertaken. We had a commercial
system based on paper and a law written in terms of paper. The
paper was being replaced by electronic media, so the law had to be
revised to reflect that change. How do you do that? Simple; you just
take the paper part out. If we had a law of paper security certificates,
we add a law of paperless "uncertificated securities." So today we
hear a good deal of discussion of the need for a law of electronic nego-
tiable promissory notes, or electronic bills of lading. Or, to use cur-
rent jargon, we consider rewriting the law in "media neutral" terms,
so that it will not matter whether the thing in question is represent-
ed by carved stone, ink on paper, or electronic pulses. But there's the
rub. Are we really so sure that the world is media neutral? To define,
and hence limit, law revision projects by the effort to devise electron-
ic equivalents of the familiar paper-based representations, such as
security certificates, promissory notes, or bills of lading, is to assume
that technological change will have no significant ontological conse-
quences. We'll still have the same old things, they'll just look (or not
look) a little different.
The lesson from Article 8 is that it doesn't always work that
way. By the late 1960s it was clear that the traditional certificate-
1. U.C.C. Article 8 (1968).
2. U.C.C. Article 8 (1990). The 1978 version of the U.C.C. is contained in
the 1990 official version of the U.C.C.
3. U.C.C. Revised Article 8 (1994). All references to the UNIFORM COMMER-
CIAL CODE, the "Code" or to "Sections" refer to the 1994 official version of the
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE unless otherwise stated.
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based system of securities transfers was not going to work any lon-
ger. The securities markets were quite literally grinding to a halt
because the back-office operations needed for settlement by physical
delivery could not keep pace with increasing trading volume. At the
time of the "paper crunch" in the late 1960s, the trading volume on
the New York Stock Exchange that so seriously strained the capaci-
ties of the clearance and settlement system was in the range of 10
million shares per day. Today, the system can easily handle daily
trading volume on routine days of hundreds of million shares. Even
during the October 1987 market break, when daily trading volume
reached the current record level of 608 million shares, the clearance
and settlement system functioned relatively smoothly. Obviously this
processing capacity could have been achieved only by the application
of modern electronic information processing systems, and that is the
case. Physical delivery of certificates plays only a minor role in the
settlement system that processes this enormous volume of securities
trading. Yet the legal rules under which the system operates are not
the uncertificated securities provisions of Article 8 that were drafted
in response to the obvious fact that the paper-based system had to be
replaced by an electronic system.
Displaying the usual perverse tendency of the world to behave in
a fashion other than that which seems most logical to a law profes-
sor, the operations people in the securities clearance and settlement
system solved the problem in a different way. They have kept the
paper certificates, they just don't do anything with them. The certifi-
cates are surrendered to a securities depository, such as the Deposito-
ry Trust Company, which holds the certificates on behalf of its mem-
ber banks and broker, who in turn hold on behalf of themselves and
their customers. Settlement of securities trades can then be effected
merely by entries on the books of these intermediaries.
The most significant step in the Revised Article 8 project was
the realization that the system of securities holding through interme-
diaries was sufficiently different from the traditional system in which
an investor's right to the underlying security was represented by a
definitive paper certificate, or from a system of the sort contemplated
by the 1978 revision, where the investor's interest would be recorded
electronically on the issuer's shareholder registry, that it required a
different set of commercial law concepts and rules. Thus, the basic
organizational principle of the 1994 revision is the distinction be-
tween the direct holding system, whether certificated or not, and the
indirect holding system. The 1994 revision uses the new term "securi-
ty entitlement" to describe the interest of a person who holds a secu-
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rity through a securities intermediary,4 and the new term "entitle-
ment holder" to refer to a person who has a security entitlement.5 A
new Part 5 of Article 8 specifies the basic rights of those who hold
security entitlements,6 subject to any applicable regulatory law such
as the federal securities laws.7 The term "security entitlement" is
defined in section 8-102(a)(17) as the package of rights that a person
who holds a security through a securities intermediary has against
that securities intermediary and the property held by that securities
intermediary. Like many legal concepts, however, the meaning of
"security entitlement" is to be found less in any specific definition
than in the matrix of rules that use the term.
The Part 5 rules provide that a securities intermediary must
itself maintain a sufficient quantity of securities, however held, to
satisfy all of its entitlement holders,s and that the positions held by
the intermediary for the entitlement holders are not subject to claims
of the intermediary's general creditors.9 Thus, a security entitlement
is not merely an in personam claim against the intermediary, but a
property interest consisting of a pro-rata claim to the fungible pool of
underlying securities held by the intermediary.lo The concept of a
security entitlement does, however, include a package of rights
against the intermediary. The indirect holding system rules cover
such basic matters as the duty of the securities intermediary to pass
through to entitlement holder the economic and legal rights of owner-
ship of the security, including the right to receive payments and
distributions,l1 and the right to exercise any voting rights. 12 The
rules also specify that the securities intermediary has a duty to com-
ply with authorized orders from the entitlement holder13 and to con-
4. U.C.C. Revised § 8-102(a)(17). More precisely, security entitlement is de-
rmed as the package of rights of a person who holds a "financial asset" through a
securities intermediary. "Financial asset" is a broader term than "security." See id.
§§ 8-102(a)(9), (17). For example, a banker's acceptance or other money market
instrument held through a securities account is a "financial asset," but not a "secu-
rity." [d. § 8-103(d), Prefatory Note III.C.9. For simplicity, this Essay will refer to
securities rather than distinguishing between securities and other financial assets.
5. [d. § 8-102(a)(7).
6. [d. §§ 8-501 to 511.
7. [d. § 8-509.
8. [d. § 8-504.
9. [d. § 8-503.
10. [d. §§ 5-503(a), (b).
11. [d. § 8-505.
12. [d. § 8-506.
13. [d. § 8-507.
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vert the entitlement holder's securities position into any other avail-
able form of securities holding that the customer requests, such as
delivering a certificate or transferring the position to an account with
another firm. 14
To see the difference between the basic concepts of the new indi-
rect holding system rules and those of the traditional Article 8 sys-
tem, consider how settlement of a typical securities trade is analyzed
under the old law and the new. Suppose that Able places an order
through Broker One to sell 10,000 shares of ABC Co. stock, and that
Baker places an order through Broker Two to buy 10,000 shares of
ABC Co.stock. Through the trading facilities of the exchange or
market on which that security is traded, Able's sell order is matched
with Baker's buy order, so that a contract is formed for the purchase
and sale of 10,000 shares of ABC Co. stock. By the custom and rules
of the exchange or market, that contract calls for settlement five days
after trade date (soon to be three days). Settlement requires that
Able cause it to occur that Baker acquire a 10,000 share position in
ABC stock. On the settlement date, entries are made on the records
of Broker One, Broker Two, and the central securities depository so
that Able's account with Broker One is debited for 10,000 shares,
Baker's account with Broker Two is credited for 10,000 shares, and
appropriate entries are made on the records of the depository to re-
flect the changes in the positions of Broker One and Broker Two.
The traditional Article 8 rules on security certificates were based
on the idea that the paper certificates could be regarded as complete
reifications of the underlying rights, so that the rules on transfer of
securities could be written using the same basic concepts as the rules
for physical goods. The ordinary mechanism for transferring property
interests in chattels is physical delivery; so too, physical delivery of a
security certificate was the basic method of dealing with interests in
securities. The old Article 8 rules used the same conceptual structure
securities transactions implemented through the indirect holding
system. By virtue of the rather complex and obscure provisions in
section 8-313 of the 1978 version, specifically, section 8-313(1)(d)(iii),
one could conclude that once all of the entries were made on the
records of Broker One, Broker Two and the depository, this resulted
in the "transfer" to Baker of "a security."
The concept of transfer is so familiar that its use in the analysis
of settlement of securities trades seems entirely natural, whatever
the details of the particular settlement system. Yet if one looks a bit
more closely at the operation of the modem clearance and settlement
14. [d. § 8-508.
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system, one begins to see some difficulties with the continued use of
the transfer concept. Any two major broker-dealers may have execut-
ed hundreds or even thousands of trades with each other in a given
security on a single day. It would be extremely inefficient if each
transaction had to be settled by making a corresponding individual
entry on the records of the depository. Significant processing efficien-
cy can be achieved by netting all of the transactions among the major
players that occur each day, so that entries need be made on the
depository's books only for the net changes in the positions of each
participant at the end of each day. Thus, in our example, although
Broker One will debit Able'~ account for 10,000 shares of ABC stock
and Broker Two will credit Baker's account for 10,000 shares, one
would not be able to identify any specific entry on the records of the
depository as reflecting the transfer of those 10,000 shares from Bro-
ker One to Broker Two. Indeed, it might well turn out that Broker
One had a net receive position and Broker Two a net deliver position
for that settlement date. How, then, is one to give coherent meaning
to the concept that settlement of the trade between Able and Baker
occurs by transfer of 10,000 shares of ABC stock from Able to Baker?
Actually, current Article 8 finesses this question. Though current
section 8-313 permits one to conclude that a transfer occurred to
Baker, it never actually says that this was a transfer from Able to
Baker; indeed, it never says anything about who the transferor was.
To be sure, there are ways of tidying up the transfer analysis. One
could analyze the steps in the settlement process one by one, so that
however the positions between Broker One and Broker Two may have
been adjusted, the final step in which an entry was made on Broker
Two's records crediting Baker's account for 10,000 shares could be
described as a transfer from Broker Two to Baker. The key point,
however, is that the only reason that one would need to trace the
path of an individual item of property through the settlement process
is to enable one, by the technique made famous by Procrustes, to
squeeze the analysis into the same conceptual structure used for
simple face to face deliveries of discrete identifiable physical objects.
Revised Article 8 takes a different approach to the analysis of
settlement of securities transactions through the indirect holding
system. Section 8-501(b) provides that "a person acquires a security
entitlement if a securities intermediary . . . indicates by book entry
that a financial asset has been credited to the person's securities
account." Thus, when Broker Two credits Baker's account for 10,000
shares of ABC stock, Baker acquires a security entitlement to 10,000
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shares of ABC stock. is That security entitlement is a package of
rights against Broker Two and the property held by Broker Two, but
the step by which Baker acquired that package of rights and interest
is not described by Revised Article 8 as a "transfer" of something
from Broker Two to Baker.
Traditionally, one of the principal objectives of the commercial
law of investment securities was to assure that the title of a purchas-
er was secure even though the transaction in which the purchaser
acquired its interest may have been wrongful against someone else.
Negotiability rules accomplished that objective by providing that a .
purchaser who took delivery of a security certificate in proper form
acquires it free from any adverse claims if the purchaser gave value
and acted without notice of any adverse claim. If we think. of the task
of law revision in this area in terms of finding electronic equivalents
for the traditional paper-based negotiable security certificates, the
redescription of the property interest of a person whose interest in a
security is reflected in electronic records would seem to call for find-
ing an electronic equivalent of negotiability. Viewed most narrowly,
the question would seem to be "Are security entitlements negotiable?"
That, however, is not a particularly helpful way of framing the ques-
tion. The specific rules and concepts associated with negotiability are
inextricably entwined with the system in which abstract rights are
reified in pieces of paper which are then transferred from person to
person. If we shift away from a commercial law analysis of settle-
ment of securities trades based on the concept of a transfer of a dis-
crete thing from person to person, there is no need or occasion to ask
the traditional questions posed by negotiability doctrines.
Asking whether a purchaser takes an item of property free from,
or subject to, property claims presupposes that the purchaser has the
same thing that someone else used to have. 16 Thus, asking whether
an electronic representation of a security or other financial right is
"negotiable" is a bit like asking whether a car with a flat tire is a
lame horseless carriage. There is, to be sure, an important quesqon
to be addressed here. But, to continue the metaphor, the question is
not whether the horseless carriage needs to be reshod or has to be
shot, the question is whether we can keep the vehicle running. So too
with the commercial law of the securities settlement system. Rather
15. Similarly, if settlement of the 10,000 shares traded between Broker One
and Broker Two were effected by an individual entry on the books of securities
depository, Broker Two would have acquired a security entitlement to 10,000
shares of ABC stock when its account with the securities depository was credited.
16. See James S. Rogers, Negotiability, Property, and Identity, 12 CARDOW
L.R. 471 (1990).
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than asking whether security entitlements are, or could be, "negotia-
ble," we need to ask whether the questions for which negotiability
rules were the answer will also arise in an electronic environment,
and if so, we need to provide appropriate solutions.
The real question, then, is what legal rules need be established
in order to ensure that a person who holds securities through a secu-
rities intermediary does not face the risk of losing her position if
someone else contends that the transaction which resulted in the
person having that position was wrongful. For example, suppose that
Able in the example described above had been holding the 10,000
shares of ABC stock as trustee for Claimant, and that Able acted in
violation of her obligations as trustee in selling the stock. Could
Claimant assert an adverse claim to the 10,000 share position that
Baker now holds through the account with Broker Two? The answer
might well be no, simply because the item of property that Baker
holds is not the "same thing" as the item that Able previously held as
trustee for Claimant. There might however, be a plausible argument,
via equity tracing rules and constructive trust doctrines, that
Claimant's interest followed through the steps in the transaction so
that it could be asserted against the property in Baker's hands. In
any event, from the perspective of the design of commercial law rules,
a system of rules for securities settlement would obviously be incom-
plete if it did not deal directly with this problem. Revised Article 8
does just that-it deals directly with the issue. Section 8-502 provides
that "An action based on an adverse claim to a financial asset,
whether framed in conversion, replevin, constructive trust, equitable
lien, or other theory, may not be asserted against a person who ac-
quires a security entitlement under Section 8-501 for value and with-
out notice of the adverse claim." There is no need to ask whether a '
security entitlement is or is not "negotiable;" nor is there is there any
need to answer the metaphysical question whether the security enti-
tlement that Baker has is the "same thing" that Able previously had.
All that is necessary it to state the issue directly and provide a clear
answer.
Much the same story can be told with respect to the other major
concern in the commercial law of securities-providing a simple and
certain structure for the creation of security interests in investment
securities. The traditional rules concerning security interests in in-
vestment securities were based on the common law pledge. A secured
party who wished to obtain the fullest measure of protection would
take physical possession of the certificate representing the security,
with any necessary indorsement. This physical delivery sufficed to
give the secured party "possession" of the collateral and thereby es-
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tablish an effective common law pledge. Moreover the pledgee could
qualify as a "bona fide purchaser" who took free from adverse claims
and thereby assure priority over any other claimants, including hold-
ers of conflicting security interests. Revised Article 8, and related
provisions of Article 9, set out a new structure of rules that deal di-
rectly with the requirements for attachment, perfection, and priori-
ties of security interests in investment securities.17 The new rules
are based on the concept of "control." The formal definition of control,
set out in section 8-106, is somewhat complex, but the basic point is
simple. A secured party obtains control if the secured party has done
whatever is necessary, given the way that the security is held, to
assure itself that it can have the collateral sold off without further
consent or action by the debtor. Thus, as with respect to issues of
adverse claim protection, it is neither necessary nor useful to ask
what it would mean to obtain "possession" or "constructive posses-
sion" of something which by definition is not a physical object capable
of possession. Rather, the task is to accomplish the objectives that
the old rules accomplished through physical concepts, but do so with-
out reliance on physical concepts.
In one of my earliest essays on the Article 8 revision project, I
described the modern indirect holding system in language ~hich at
the time struck me a rather clever: "For most, if not all, of the securi-
ties held through DTC, physical certificates representing DTC's total
position do exist. These Jumbo certificates,' however, are never de-
livered from person to person. Rather they are stored in carefully
guarded vaults, where they live out their ·wholly uneventful lives as
testaments to the difficulties of adapting legal structures to rapidly
changing commercial practices."18 When I first learned about this
system, the only word I could think of to describe it was "silly." In-
deed, during the most enjoyable part of my job as Reporter-going on
"field trips" to see how the system worked-I insisted that someone
pull out one of these certificates so that I could actually see and
touch it, mostly because I couldn't help but feel a bit skeptical about
whether there really were any such certificates. But as I reflect upon
the phenomenon now, a few years later, I see it somewhat differently.
The fact that the certificates in an immobilized securities depository
system are essentially irrelevant points to some rather important
things about the task of adapting law to technological change. In this
setting-and I suspect in many others-the movement from a paper
17. U.C.C. Revised § 9-115 (1994).
18. James S. Rogers, An Overview of the Current Project to Revise U.C.C.
Article 8, U.C.C. BULLETIN (May 1992).
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to an electronic environment has not simply been a matter of
changing predicates of unchanging legal objects; the significant ob-
jects themselves have changed. In the traditional securities holding
system, the key relationship for commercial law was that between
the investor and the issuer, and that relationship could be analyzed
by application of property concepts to a physical embodiment of the
underlying rights. In the modem indirect holding system, it remains
just as true that for most purposes the key relationship is that be-
tween the investor and the issuer, but for purposes of the commercial
law rules concerning the mechanics of settlement the key relation-
ship is that between an investor and its securities intermediary. That
relationship is neither represented by any physical or metaphysical
object, nor capable of analysis in terms drawn from the property law
of physical objects. As the significant legal objects change, so too
must the legal language. A car is not really a horseless carriage, and
a securities position recorded electronically is not really an electronic
certificate.
